Electronic network voting systems are potentially very vulnerable to mass manipulation of votes and / or voters. Therefore the goal is to develop systems that are against said mass manipulation while not imposing overly complicated cryptography on the voter. We concentrate on historic attacks and universal goals for network voting systems to learn a lesson and develop according guidelines that can be universally used to design and implement network voting systems. The guidelines are furthermore evaluated and applied to existing voting systems.
Current electronic voting systems require an anonymous channel during the voting phase to prevent coercion. Typically, low-latency anonymization-networks like Tor are used for this purpose. In this paper we devise a monitoring attack that allows an attacker to monitor whether participants of an election voted, despite the use of a low-latency net- work during the voting phase, thereby breaking an important part of coercion-freeness. We implement a simulation carrying out our attack and measure its success rates.
Electronic and remote voting has become a large field of research and brought forth a multiplicity of schemes, systems, cryptographic primitives as well as formal definitions and requirements for electronic elections. In this survey we try to give a brief and precise overview and summary of the current situation.
For this thesis a Python module called PyDYN was designed and implemented. PyDYN adapts existing generic solvers for pseudo boolean optimization to compute solutions for the dependency resolution problem. For further research several analyses of python installation files and their structure were made. In the context of de- signing PyDYN several other needs for a metadata database or an automated downloader for packages arose and were catered to in scope of the thesis.